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Abstract. Quantum encryption is a well studied problem for both clas-
sical and quantum information. However, little is known about quantum
encryption schemes which enable the user, under different keys, to learn
different functions of the plaintext, given the ciphertext. In this paper,
we give a novel one-bit secret-key quantum encryption scheme, a clas-
sical extension of which allows different key holders to learn different
length subsequences of the plaintext from the ciphertext. We prove our
quantum-classical scheme secure under the notions of quantum seman-
tic security, quantum entropic indistinguishability, and recent security
definitions from the field of functional encryption.
Keywords: Quantum Encryption, Quantum Semantic Security, Quantum En-
tropic Indistinguishability, Functional Encryption
1 Introduction
In a pioneering work, Boneh, Sahai and Waters formalized the notion of func-
tional encryption in 2010 [3]. This generalization of an encryption scheme en-
abled users possessing different keys to learn different functions over the plain-
text from the ciphertext. There have been many (classical) schemes proposed
to realize different variants of functional encryption since the inception of the
notion. However, despite it’s power, there have been no equivalent formalizations
of functional encryption for quantum information.
Over the last few years, formal definitions of quantum entropic security [1] and
quantum computational security [2] have been introduced and accepted. More-
over, for classical functional encryption schemes, refined security definitions [4]
have been recently presented, which extend the notion of security given in the
original paper [3].
In this work, we first present a one-qubit secret-key quantum encryption scheme
for classical information. The scheme is proven secure under quantum semantic
security (Definition 8, [2]) and quantum entropic indistinguishability (Definition
3, [1]). The classical, functional extension of this scheme is then proven to be
full-message private, full-function private (Definitions 2.4,3.2 [4]) and weakly
simulation-secure (Definition 5, [3]). Intuitively, the security of the quantum
encryption scheme and it’s extension are based upon distinguishing computa-
tionally between two different but uniformly distributed bits, which is a hard
problem. Also the functional extension allows the user to learn different length
subsequences of the message, with a different subsequence per instantiation of
the scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present the syntax - the notations
and definitions used to present our scheme, in the preliminaries section. The
third section of the paper gives the construction and correctness arguments for
our scheme. The proofs of security are given in the following section. We then
give the operational aspects of the scheme in the discussion section. To catalogue
other works in quantum encryption, we give next a section on related work. In
the final section, we present our conclusions and future extensions possible for
this work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we define the syntax and the definitions used for presenting our
cryptosystem and establishing it’s correctness and security.
2.1 Notation
Let λ be the security parameter. Let poly(λ), exp(λ), negl(λ), non-negl(λ)
denote the set of all polynomial, exponential, negligible, and non-negligible func-
tions on λ respectively. We will sometimes abuse notation and place these func-
tion classes in place of functions that belong to these classes.
Let {|0〉 , |1〉} be the computational basis for our QPT algorithms. For both our
QPT and PPT algorithms, we will use AO to denote that A has oracle access to
O. We will use U(V ) to denote uniform distribution on universe V .
2.2 Correctness Definitions
We begin by defining the functionality to be realized and the structure of our
scheme. These definitions are inspired from [3], but modified appropriately.
Definition 1 (Functionality). A functionality F , given a ∈ A, defined over
(K,M) is a function Fa : K×M → {0, 1}∗ describable as a deterministic Turing
Machine. We call A the functionality-index space, M the message space, and
K ∪ {ℵ} the key space.
We introduce ℵ to allow ∀a ∈ A, ∀m ∈M,Fa(ℵ,m) = |m|.
Definition 2 (Hybrid FE Scheme). A hybrid Functional Encryption (hFE)
scheme (Π,Ξ) for a functionality F , given functionality-index a, defined over
(K,M), is a tuple of PPT algorithms Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) and a
secret-key quantum encryption scheme Ξ = (QE ,QD) where Enc and Dec have
oracle access to QE and QD respectively.
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This scheme must satisfy the following correctness condition given A, ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈
M :
1. msk ← Setup (1λ, A)
2. sk ← KeyGenmsk(k)
3. |c〉 ← EncQEmsk(m)
4. n← DecQD(sk, |c〉)
It is mandated that msk contains a, and n = Fa(k,m) with probability 1.
Note that that hardwiring of the master-secret allows only oracle access to
KeyGen and Enc . This allows any user to encrypt any message m via an or-
acle call to get the quantum cipher-text. However in our proofs of security the
adversary has only oracle access to KeyGen and Enc . Thus the above definition
is limited but sound.
2.3 Security Definitions
We give definitions for quantum IND-secure encryptions, and quantum entropic
indistinguishability first. Note that they are reproduced from their original sources.
Definition 3 (IND-Security, Definition 7, [2]). A secret-key quantum scheme
(QE ,QD) with secret s, has indistinguishable encryptions, or is IND-secure, if
for every QPT adversary (M,D),
|Pr[D{(QEs ⊗ 1E)(ρME)} = 1]− Pr[D{(QEs ⊗ 1E)(|0〉 〈0|M ⊗ ρE)} = 1]
≤ negl(λ).
where ρME ←M(1λ), ρE = TrM (ρME) and the probabilities are taken over the
internal randomness of QE ,M,D.
Definition 4 (Entropic Indistinguishability, Definition 3, [1]). An en-
cryption scheme with superoperator E is said to be (t, ǫ)-indistinguishable if for
all (density) operators ρ such that H∞(ρ) ≥ t we have ||E(ρ) − 1dI||tr ≤ ǫ. Here
d is the size of the message space.
We next give security definitions for classical functional ciphers adopted from [4]
in the context of our quantum-classical scheme. Note that superscripts are not
exponentiations but indexes. Also ∀b, Encmsk,b(m0,m1) = Encmsk(mb),
KeyGenmsk,b(f
0, f1) = KeyGenmsk(f
b).
Definition 5 (Valid Message-Privacy Adversary, Definition 2.3, [4]).
A polynomial-time algorithm A is a valid message-privacy adversary if for all
private-key functional encryption schemes (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) and for all
λ ∈ N, b ∈ {0, 1} and for all f and (m0,m1) with which A queries oracles KeyGen
and Encmsk,b respectively, we have f(m
0) = f(m1).
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Definition 6 (Full Message Privacy, Definition 2.4, [4]). A private-key
functional encryption scheme (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is fully message private
if for any valid message-privacy adversary A:
|Pr[AKeyGenmsk(·),Encmsk,0(·,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr[AKeyGenmsk(·),Encmsk,1(·,·)(λ) = 1]|
≤ negl(λ).
Definition 7 (Valid Function-Privacy Adversary, Definition 3.1, [4]).
A polynomial-time algorithm A is a valid function-privacy adversary if for all
private-key functional encryption schemes (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) and for all
λ ∈ N, b ∈ {0, 1} and for all (f0, f1) and (m0,m1) with which A queries
oracles KeyGenmsk,b and Encmsk,b respectively, we have |m0| = |m1|, |f0| =
|f1|, and f0(m0) = f1(m1) where | · | denotes the length of description.
Definition 8 (Full Function Privacy, Definition 3.2, [4]). A private-key
functional encryption scheme (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is fully message private
if for any valid function-privacy adversary A:
|Pr[AKeyGenmsk,0(·),Encmsk,0(·,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr[AKeyGenmsk,1(·),Encmsk,1(·,·)(λ) = 1]|
≤ negl(λ).
Finally we give a scheme security definition from the seminal work [3]. This has
been updated to make the functionality index a part of the comparison (so that
we are comparing the same function).
Definition 9 (Weak Simulation Security, Definition 5, [3]). A functional
encryption scheme (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is weakly simulation-secure if for
all polynomial-time algorithms (Msg,Adv) there exists a polynomial-time algo-
rithm Sim such that the distribution ensembles given in Algorithm 1 are compu-
tationally indistinguishable.
Algorithm 1 Weak-Simulation Security Game
msk = a← Setup (1λ, A)
(m, τ )← Msg(1λ)
|c〉 ← Encmsk(m) via an oracle call
α← AdvKeyGenmsk(·)(|c〉 , τ )
Let (y1, y2, ..., yl) be the Adv queries
Output real dist. (a,m, τ, α, y1, ..., yl)
Give Functionality-Index a from A.
(m, τ )← Msg(1λ)
α← SimFa(·,m)(1λ, τ, Fa(ℵ,m))
Let (y1, y2, ..., yl) be the Sim queries to
Fa
Output ideal dist. (a,m, τ, α, y1, ..., yl)
3 A Quantum-Classical Construction
3.1 The One-Qubit Quantum Cryptosystem
We introduce our novel single qubit secret-key quantum cipher Ξ in Algorithm
2. Note that the secret key is given by the enclosing hFE cipher. The scheme is
proven correct in Theorem 1 under the appropriate unitary map.
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Algorithm 2 The Scheme Ξ = (QE ,QD), given the secret-key bit s, Bloch-
sphere equatorial-position θ, message-bit b
1: procedure QEs,θ(b)
2: Prepare |s〉 from s and |b〉 from b.
3: Sample bit r ⇐ U({0, 1}).
4: Return (|c0〉 , |c1〉) = (H
θ
r |s〉 ,H
θ
r |b〉).
5: end procedure
6: procedure QDs,θ(|c0〉 , |c1〉)
7: Obtain |r〉 = (Hθs)
† |c0〉.
8: Prepare r from |r〉 (by measurement, with probability 1).
9: Obtain |b〉 = (Hθr)
† |c1〉.
10: Prepare b from |b〉 (by measurement, with probability 1).
11: Return b.
12: end procedure
Theorem 1 (The Quantum Encryption Unitary Map and Ξ Correct-
ness).
Let Hθu :=
1√
2
[
1 1
(−1)ueiθ (−1)u+1eiθ
]
be the unitary map in scheme Ξ.
Then ∀θ, u, v,Hθu |v〉 = Hθv |u〉, and scheme Ξ (in Algorithm 2) is correct.
Proof. First, it is an easy verification that ∀θ, u, (Hθu)†Hθu = Hθu(Hθu)† = I. Next
we have Hθu |v〉 = 1√2
[
1
(−1)u⊕veiθ
]
= Hθv |u〉. Finally, to show that the scheme
is correct,
QDs,θ(QEs,θ(b)) = QDs,θ(Hθr |s〉 ,Hθr |b〉) = ((Hθs)†Hθr |s〉 , (Hθ?)†Hθr |b〉)
= ((Hθs)†Hθs |r〉 , (Hθ?)†Hθr |b〉) = (|r〉 , (Hθ?)†Hθr |b〉)
= (Hθr)†Hθr |b〉 = |b〉 = b with probability 1,
as we obtain the inverting map of Hθr |b〉 after recovering r.
Note that encrypting the randomness under the secret is equivalent to encrypting
the secret under the randomness - a unique property of the unitary map Hθu.
3.2 The hFE Scheme
Our message (plaintext) length |m| will be greater that or equal to the se-
curity parameter. Furthermore, |m| = Q ∈ poly(λ). We will use Σ = {σ :
{0, 1}λ → {0, 1}Q| σ is injective} as part of the functionality index space. Note
|Σ| ∈ exp(λ). Our scheme is given in Algorithm 3.
We will also use the following nomenclature for our correctness and security
proofs.
Definition 10. We say that an arbitrary key k = κq if there exists (exactly one)
q ∈ [Q] such that σ(κQ) − σ(k) = −Q−q+12 or σ(κQ) − σ(k) = Q−q2 . Also, the
function fκq induced by key κq is fκq (m) = m1m2...mq.
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Algorithm 3 The Scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec), given k ∈
{0, 1}λ,m ∈ {0, 1}Q, oracle access to Ξ = (QE ,QD)
procedure Setup(1λ, Σ)
Sample a = (σ, κQ)⇐ U(Σ, {0, 1}
λ)
Return msk = a
end procedure
procedure KeyGena(k)
Let σ(κQ) = (s1, s2, ..., sQ)
Obtain δ ← σ(κQ)− σ(k).
If ∃q ∈ [Q] such that δ = −Q−q+1
2
or δ = Q−q
2
return sk = (s1, s2, ..., sq,⊥,⊥, ...,⊥).
Otherwise return sk = ⊥.
end procedure
procedure EncQEa (m)
Let σ(κQ) = (s1, s2, ..., sQ)
∀j ∈ [Q], (|cj,0〉 , |cj,1〉)← QEsj ,θj (mj) where θj =
2pij
Q
Return |c〉 = (|cj,0〉 , |cj,1〉)j∈[Q]
end procedure
procedure DecQD(sk, |c〉)
Let sk = (s1, s2, ..., sq,⊥,⊥, ...,⊥)
∀j ∈ [q], mj ← QDsj ,θj (|cj,0〉 , |cj,1〉) where θj =
2pij
Q
Return m1m2m3...mq
end procedure
Intuitively, κq reveals the first q-bits of the message, and there is exactly one
such κq.
Correctness and Positional Secrecy Given for a message m, a particular
user has key κq,
DecQD(KeyGena(κq), Enc
QE
a (m)) = Dec
QD(s1s2...sq, (QEsj ,θj(mj))j∈[Q])
= m1m2...mq with probability 1.
The different positions of the cipher-qubit on the Bloch sphere equator allow
recovery of different subsequences of the message, a notion we call positional
secrecy. More formally, let η : {0, 1}Q → {0, 1}Q be a permutation that is pre-
decided, or optionally is the output of Setup . Then we use QE to encrypt mη(j)
under sj , θj . This results in key κq recovering the q-subsequence induced by η
(rearranging the message bits so that the indices are in order):
DecQD(KeyGena(κq), Enc
QE
a (m)) = Dec
QD(s1s2...sq, (QEsj ,θj(mη(j)))j∈[Q])
= mη(1)mη(2)...mη(q) with probability 1.
4 Scheme Security
We will use the following corollary for our security proofs in this section.
Corollary 1. If Hθu is as defined in Theorem 1, then ∀u, b, θ Hθu |b〉 = Hθu⊕b |0〉.
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4.1 Security of the Quantum Encryption Scheme
We first note that (before prepending with the randomness) |QEs,θ(b)| = 2|b|
and so the core-function based impossibility result (Definition 6.1,6.2 Theorem
6.3, [5]) does not apply to Ξ.
Theorem 2 (Semantic Security). The one-qubit secret-key encryption scheme
Ξ is quantum semantically secure.
Proof. First, we prove that Ξ = (QE ,QD) is IND-secure under Definition 3.
Let’s say there exists a QPT distinguisher qD that can distinguish between
QEs,θ(|b〉) and QEs,θ(|0〉) in time poly(λ) with a probability non-negl(λ).
Consider the following attack where cD is a distinguisher between r⊕0 and r⊕b,
given s, θ and a uniformly random r:
1. The message adversary chooses b.
2. Sample r ⇐ U({0, 1}).
3. Prepare Hθr⊕s |0〉 and send it to qD as it’s first argument.
4. Choose a challenge c∗ uniformly between r ⊕ 0 and r ⊕ b and send it to cD.
5. cD prepares Hθc∗ |0〉 and sends it to qD as it’s second argument.
6. qD now has one of the encryptions between QEs,θ(|0〉) and QEs,θ(|b〉).
7. qD distinguishes between the two possible encryptions and sends it’s decision,
0 or b, to cD (in time poly(λ) with a probability non-negl(λ)).
8. cD, for the challenge c∗ outputs it’s decision (0 or b), the same as the result
given by qD.
Thus we have constructed a computational distinguisher cD between two statis-
tically identical distributions r ⊕ 0 and r ⊕ b, even for a b different than 0, a
contradiction. So qD cannot exist (step 7 cannot happen) and Ξ is IND-secure.
We next use Theorem 9 from [2] to conclude that Ξ is quantum semantic secure.
Theorem 3 (Entropic Indistinguishability). The one-qubit secret-key en-
cryption scheme Ξ is entropically (t, 12 (2
1−t−1))-indistinguishable for min-entropy
t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Here we prove entropic-indistinguishability (Definition 4) of the message
qubit under Ξ. Since the secret qubit comes from the uniform distribution, it
is perfectly indistinguishable (under the same superoperator) and it’s security
proof is thus implied.
Let ρ =
∑
j∈{0,1} γj |j〉 〈j| be the operator corresponding to the message qubit.
The only associated interpretations of ρ are classical, according to our scheme.
Let E be the superoperator corresponding to our unitary map. So E(ρ) :=
Hθrρ(Hθr)† for uniformly random r and the message space distribution has min-
entropy t = − log(max{γ0, γ1}) ∈ [0, 1].
Firstly, it’s an easy verification that
E(ρ) := Hθrρ(Hθr)† =
1
2
[
1 (γ0 − γ1)(−1)reiθ
(γ0 − γ1)(−1)reiθ 1
]
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Now, ||E(ρ)− 1
2
I||tr = 1
2
Tr
√
(E(ρ)− 1
2
I)†(E(ρ) − 1
2
I) =
1
2
Tr
[
|γ0−γ1|
2 0
0 |γ0−γ1|2
]
=
|γ0 − γ1|
2
=
|2×max{γ0, γ1} − 1|
2
=
|2× 2−t − 1|
2
=
1
2
(21−t − 1)
Thus Ξ is (t, 12 (2
1−t − 1))-indistinguishable.
4.2 Security of the hFE scheme
Now we prove security of the classical extension of our quantum encryption
using the definitions of privacy/security from the domain of classical functional
encryption.
Theorem 4 (Fully Message Private). The hFE scheme (Π,Ξ) is fully mes-
sage private (under Definition 6).
Proof. We start by observing that since the QPT adversaryA is a valid message-
privacy adversary (Definition 5), the messages m0 and m1 agree on all bits
[q] such that A queries κq. Let q∗ = max{q : A queries κq}. Then ∃j∗ ∈
{q∗ + 1, ..., Q} such that m0j∗ = 1 − m1j∗ , otherwise the two encryption ora-
cle calls are identical.
Now, let’s say A can distinguish between Enca,0(m0,m1) and Enca,1(m0,m1) in
time poly(λ)with a probability non-negl(λ). Let cDj , ∀j ∈ [Q] be distinguish-
ers on a bit. Let s ∈ {0, 1}Q be the given secret and θj = 2pijQ , ∀j ∈ [Q] be
the given encryption angles. Now consider the following attack for a uniformly
random r ∈ {0, 1}Q:
1. The adversary chooses messages m0,m1.
2. Sample r ⇐ U({0, 1}Q).
3. Prepare ∀j,Hθjrj⊕sj |0〉 and send them to A in order as it’s odd-position ar-
guments.
4. Choose a challenge bit b uniformly between 0 and 1.
5. Send challenge ∀j, uj = rj ⊕mbj to cDj .
6. Each cDj prepares Hθjuj |0〉 and sends it (in order) to A as it’s even-position
arguments.
7. A now has the encryption Enca(mb).
8. A outputs b′ = b sends it to cDj , ∀j (in time poly(λ) with a probability
non-negl(λ)).
9. cDj , for the challenge uj outputs it’s decision b
′.
Thus we have constructed a computational distinguisher cDj∗ between two statis-
tically identical distributions r⊕mbj∗ and r⊕m1−bj∗ wherembj∗ = 1−m1−bj∗ . This is
a contradiction. So, A cannot exist (step 8 cannot happen with a non-negligible
probability) and (Π,Ξ) is fully message private.
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Corollary 2 (Fully Function Private). The hFE scheme (Π,Ξ) is fully func-
tion private (under Definition 8).
Proof. Again, on grounds that the QPT adversary A is a valid function-privacy
adversary (Definition 7), f0κq0 (m
0) = f1κq1 (m
1)⇒ f0κq0 = f1κq1 ⇒ κq0 = κq1 .
This means that ∀q0, q1 ∈ [Q], KeyGena,0(κq0 , κq1) = KeyGena,1(κq0 , κq1) and
the problem reduces to proving full message privacy, which has been proven
(Theorem 4). Also, for completeness, every key in {0, 1}λ \ {κq : q ∈ [Q]} gives
a secret ⊥, rendering the two KeyGena,u, u ∈ {0, 1} oracles same (in output this
time).
Theorem 5 (Weakly Simulation Secure). The hFE scheme (Π,Ξ) is weakly
simulation-secure (under Definition 9).
Proof (Sketch). Intuitively, we will show that the output distributions of the
adversary and simulator are statistically identical (i.e., having zero statistical
distance). By virtue of the game, other distributions are same and proving the
α’s identical is sufficient to prove the real and ideal distribution tuples are sta-
tistically identical.
First, let us define the following (deterministic) function:
Sa(k) := If k = κq for some q ∈ [Q], return the first q-bits of σ(κQ). Otherwise
return ⊥.
And let α = (α1, α2, ..., αl) corresponding to key query distributions (yj)j∈[l].
The first thing to note is that the αj ’s are distributions on m1m2...mq for
q ∈ {0} ∪ [Q], and these distributions are a deterministic map, say φ, from
Sa(yj). To see this in the real world game, first observe that since the quan-
tum cipher-text is IND-secure, it does not leak any information about the mes-
sage to Adv, and so αrealj = φ(KeyGena(yj)) = φ(Sa(yj)). In the ideal world
game, firstly, Fa(ℵ,m) = zQ for some integer z, leaking nothing additional
about the chosen message vector. Also, from the view of comparing the distri-
bution vectors, and since the m distributions are identical by definition, the
queries of Sim to Fa(yj ,m) can be reduced to a function of a and yj alone.
That function is exactly αidealj = φ(Sa(yj)) since only one key κq maps to one
m1m2...mq, q ∈ [Q] and all other keys map to the null message. Now let’s
say there is a non-zero statistical distance ∆ between αrealj and α
ideal
j . Then
0 < ∆(αrealj , α
ideal
j ) = ∆(S
real
a (yj), S
ideal
a (yj))
≤ ∆(yj , yj) (as Sreala = Sideala = Sa, applying Theorem 7.6, [6])
⇒ 0 < ∆(yj , yj).
Thus we have a contradiction. So ∀j ∈ [l], αrealj = αidealj , and the real and ideal
distribution ensembles are statistically indistinguishable.
5 Discussion
We see that the scheme (Π,Ξ) permits an arbitrary, polynomial-sized stretch in
the length of the message, given the security parameter. This is realizable due
to the infinitely many cipher positions permissible on the Bloch-sphere equator.
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Note that this is not possible classically.
Also, there needs to be consideration on efficient representations of arbitrary
injective functions from λ-bits to Q-bits, which in general have exponential size
tables. Note that for the purpose of our scheme (where [[x]] denotes an efficient
representation of x),
[[a]] := (σ(κQ), κ1, κ2, ..., κQ) should suffice (see Definition 10).
Finally, it’s important to observe that the keys k should be distributed only after
instantiating a, that is, running Setup. This is true because under different σ’s,
the same key k does not necessarily give the same decryption.
6 Related Work
Over the past twenty years, there has been a lot of work done on quantum ciphers.
Most of them encrypt pure quantum states as opposed to classical information.
Beginning with private quantum channels [9] whose optimality was proved later
[10], quantum vernam ciphers were developed [20]. An optimal scheme based on
quantum one-time pads [11] was proposed, later followed by characterisation of
a one-way quantum encryption scheme [29] more general than private quantum
channels.
Initially, Zhou proposed an algorithm to encrypt binary classical information
[28]. Zhou then proposed qubit block encryption algorithms [40,39] which were
later improved [12] to base their security on the BB84 protocol. Other than
these, there have been parallel works on symmetric-key schemes [26,14], a d-
level systems’ scheme [15], and schemes based on modified BB84 [18], quantum
key generation [7], conjugate coding [21], and quantum shift registers / hill ci-
pher [19].
Quantum public-key encryption (QPKE) schemes have been addressed by the
community since the beginning of this century [31]. There have been QPKE
schemes with information theoretic security proposed by Pan [32] and Liang
[25,24]. Also, there have been QPKE schemes based on single qubit rotations
[30,33] and classical NP-complete problems [36].
More recently, quantum (fully) homomorphic encryption (Q(F)HE) schemes
have been developed by the community. Liang proposed a perfectly secure QFHE
scheme based on the quantum one-time pad [22]. This was followed by a QFHE
scheme based on the universal quantum circuit [23]. Also, there has been a QHE
scheme for polynomial sized circuits given by Dulek [13].
Very early, a KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) approach to cryp-
tography [37] was presented. Other works in the space of conventional quantum
encryption include studies on optimality of quantum encryption schemes [27],
the use of quantum keys as opposed to classical keys [17], and non-malleable
ciphers [8]. Quantum secure direct communication [34] and quantum key dis-
tribution [38] via quantum encryption have also been proposed. Finally, other
notions of security [35,16] have been professed.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have introduced a novel one-qubit secret-key quantum encryp-
tion scheme for classical information. We have proved this scheme to have quan-
tum semantic security, and quantum entropic indistinguishability as a function
of the min-entropy of the message distribution. We have extended this scheme to
permit recovery of different length subsequences of the message using different
keys, under a new notion of positional secrecy. The resulting (hybrid) functional
encryption scheme is proven to be full-message private, full-function private and
weakly simulation-secure.
We hope to see the following improvements in the future, given the current sta-
tus of our quantum-classical scheme:
1. Given that, under Ξ, encryptions of both 0 and 1 are statistically indistin-
guishable, perhaps there exists a proof of entropic security (Definition 2, [1])
for the quantum scheme.
2. We recognize that the biggest drawback of the classical extension is that
KeyGen and Enc algorithms are only available via oracle calls, although that
does not affect the security proofs. There could be a modification which
permits making these algorithms public.
3. We hope that this work motivates a new general definition for quantum func-
tional encryption - fully quantum schemes which permit learning meaningful
functions from encryptions of (general) quantum states.
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